Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 21:24:31 -0400 (EDT)
From: CTuroff@aol.com
To: Multiple recipients of list CX-L <cx-l@debate.net>
Subject: Fwd: DDI Arg. Lists 1
For all of you wondering about a complete description of DDI arguments.......
Corey Turoff
BGHS Debate
[ Part 2: "Included Message" ]
Date: 01 Sep 98 14:45:57 EDT
From: Kenneth M. Strange <Kenneth.M.Strange@Dartmouth.EDU>
To: CTuroff@aol.com
Subject: Re: DDI Arg. Lists 1
[Only the first 2K of this message is displayed, as it is too long to view
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sorry for the delay I'm catching up on weeks of e-mail. Post this to the cx-l
if you like.
ken
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
TBM Affirmative - Baker/Russell
Teams Running This Case: 3, 5. 7, 12
Observation 1 -- BMD Coming
Payne and Kortunov '97
Observation 2 -- Scenario 1 -- Russia
1. MBD Kills ABM Treaty
BAS, Jan. '96
2. BMD Kills Arms Control
Mathias & Rhinelander, '95
3. BMD Causes an Arms Race
Atlanta Journal Constitution, '95
4. TMD Causes and Arms Race
BAS, Jan. '96
Observation 2 -- Scenario 2 -- China
BMD Causes a Chinese Backlash
BAS, July '97
Observation 3 -- Underview
A. 1. No Threats
Koch, '98
2. No Accidental Launch
Mendelson, '96
B. 1. BMD Doesn't Solve
Cottle, '96
2. BMD Trades Off with Arms Control
CSM, July 18, 1996
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Tobacco Affirmative - Baker/Russell
Teams Running This Case: 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11
Observation 1 Inherency
1. The US Government Promotes Tobacco Abroad
-Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law March 1996
2. US companies use advanced marketing efforts to exploit
Russian Children
-The Moscow Times 7-14-98
3. In response to theses actions, Russian companies increase their
production
-The Star 12-16-97
4. US Tobacco Companies control the domestic market
-Newsday 6-5-97
Observation 2 Harms
1. Western marketing efforts make anti-smoking efforts futile
-Macleans 7-26-93
2. Smoking kills 750 Russians a day
-Agence France Press 5-28-97
3. The State has the moral duty to ban exports
-Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3-96
4. U.S. government promotion of Tobacco violates Human Rights
-Law and Policy in International Business 9-22-96
Observation 3 Solvency
1. Export bans deter use
-US newswire 12-6-95
2. Banning government support helps turn the tide
-New Jersey Law Journal 6-1-98
3. Western efforts directly responsible for Russ
[ Part 2.2: "Attached Text" ]
sorry for the delay I'm catching up on weeks of e-mail. Post this to the cx-l
if you like.
ken
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
TBM Affirmative - Baker/Russell
Teams Running This Case: 3, 5. 7, 12
Observation 1 -- BMD Coming
Payne and Kortunov '97
Observation 2 -- Scenario 1 -- Russia
1. MBD Kills ABM Treaty
BAS, Jan. '96
2. BMD Kills Arms Control
Mathias & Rhinelander, '95
3. BMD Causes an Arms Race
Atlanta Journal Constitution, '95
4. TMD Causes and Arms Race
BAS, Jan. '96
Observation 2 -- Scenario 2 -- China
BMD Causes a Chinese Backlash
BAS, July '97
Observation 3 -- Underview
A. 1. No Threats
Koch, '98
2. No Accidental Launch
Mendelson, '96
B. 1. BMD Doesn't Solve
Cottle, '96
2. BMD Trades Off with Arms Control
CSM, July 18, 1996
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Tobacco Affirmative - Baker/Russell
Teams Running This Case: 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11
Observation 1 Inherency
1. The US Government Promotes Tobacco Abroad
-Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law March 1996
2. US companies use advanced marketing efforts to exploit
Russian Children
-The Moscow Times 7-14-98
3. In response to theses actions, Russian companies increase their
production
-The Star 12-16-97
4. US Tobacco Companies control the domestic market
-Newsday 6-5-97
Observation 2 Harms
1. Western marketing efforts make anti-smoking efforts futile
-Macleans 7-26-93
2. Smoking kills 750 Russians a day
-Agence France Press 5-28-97
3. The State has the moral duty to ban exports
-Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 3-96
4. U.S. government promotion of Tobacco violates Human Rights
-Law and Policy in International Business 9-22-96
Observation 3 Solvency
1. Export bans deter use
-US newswire 12-6-95
2. Banning government support helps turn the tide
-New Jersey Law Journal 6-1-98
3. Western efforts directly responsible for Russian smoking
-Ottawa Citizen 3-21-98
4. Fears of a black market wrong
-New York Times 5-5-98
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
GT-MHR Affirmative - Baker/Russell
Teams Running This Case: 4, 6
I. Inherency
A. Dual Track Now -- not solving (Augusta Chronicle, 3/12/98)
B. Russia doesn't like dual track (Newsday, 12/10/98)
C. Russia likes GT-MHRs (BBC, 5/22/98)
Plan: The U.S. federal government will negotiate and then codify the dual track
agreement to require the exclusive use of the advanced MOX technologies, i.e.
Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactors (GT-MHRs). The U.S. will initiate a
program with MINATOM to deploy GT-MHRs in the U.S. and Russia. Funding through
normal means. Enforcement through the modified dual track agreement. We
reserve the right to clarify intent.
II. Advantage 1: Relations
A. Now key for relations (Albuquerque Tribune, 7/3/98)
B. Destroying relations leads to nationalism (Ariel Cohen, PhD, Senior Policy
Analyst, Heritage Foundation, 12/15/97)
C. Co-op on plutonium solves relations (Frederico Pena, Secretary of the U.S.
DOE, 5/26/98)
III. Advantage 2: Proliferation
A. Too much excess plutonium (The Nuclear Control Institute, 1/97)
B. Storage risks terrorism and plutonium (Chris Bluth, Staff Writer, 12/1/97,
Jane's Intelligence Review)
C. Terroriam leads to nuclear war (Beres, Prof of Political Science and
International Law, Purdue U, 1987)
D. Must control plutonium to solve (Committee on International Security and
Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, 1994)
E. GT-MHRs Solve (Linden Blue, Vice Chairman of General Atomics, 5/19/98)
IV. Solvency
A. GT-MHRs are melt-down proof (Linden Blue, previously cited)
B. GT-MHRs are feasible (Linden Blue, previously cited)
C. Russia likes Gt-MHRs (Linden Blue, previously cited)
D. Codifying dual track key to solve (Nucleonics Week, 12/18/98)
E. U.S.-Russia Co-op is key to international modeling (Frederico Pena,
previously cited)
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Yeltsin Affirmative - Davis/Happe
Teams Running This Case: 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 51
1. Current US FP toward Russia Focuses Exclusively On Yeltsin. This lack of
Long-Term vision inevitably dooms Russian Democ. and US/Russ. Relations.
USA TODAY 4/8/98
2. We Should Continue to Support Yeltsin but not EXCLUSIVELY- we need to expand
our policy contacts w/ the Russo Gov.
Patrick J. Leahy (senator) jan 24 94 pg. l/m FDCH Testimony
3. PLAN- The U.S. gov will change its FP to R by discontinuing the practice of
exclusive focus on and unconditional support of the president of Russia. fund
enforce...blah blah
Adv: US/R Relations
1. S/Q policy dooms relations - unqualified support for Yeltsin fuels
nationalism and once he inevitably leaves office our diplomacy will collapse
The Independent, May 28 96 l/n
2. Good US/R relations promotes global econ, polit and military stability
Victor Israelyan (washington quarterly winter 98 pg. 49
3. Unconditional backing of Yeltsin backfires it fuels nationalism and destroys
longterm relations
Sunday Telegram 3/14/93
4. Unequivocal support for Yeltsin fuels domestic resentment against the U.S.
risking a Russian foreign policy orientation that is anti west
Ariel Cohen, Heritage Foundation 3/98 L/n
5. An Anti-West Russia FP polarizes the globe causing an Asian-Euro
confrontation
Israelyan, pg. 47-65
6. L/N Economist 92 : apocalypse or armageddon????????
Adv: Democ.
1. Basing U.S. policy to R exclusively upon Yeltsin dooms democratic reform in
Russia
Theodore C. Hailes and William C. Martel (1995, Russia's Democratic Moment)
2. Basing U.S. Policy soley upon Yelt. endorses non democratic action
preventing the development of truely INSTITUTIONAL democ
Samuel P. Huntington, Heritage Foundation Reports, Feb. 97
3. Russian Democ. Stabalizes Eurasia - failure => Int'l Conflict
4. Russian Democ avoids hostile and aggresive policy oreintation averting a
global hot war
Isrealyan
5. Russian Democ is Overwhelmingly good -- the alternative is nuclear war
throughout Eurasia
Diamond, Foreign Policy 92, pg. 301
Solvency
1. U.S. policy to Russia should be to push democ. and free markets not
particular politicians who supposedly embody these ideals
Cohen 98
2. U.S. should support Russian democracy -- when Yeltsin acts undemocratically
we should say something
Zbigniew Brzezinski feb. 16 95, FDCH testimony
3. The U.S. should push democ and reforms across the board trying to pick
winners ensures policy collapse
World Press Review, May 97
4. US leverage can produce institutional change - promoting real political and
econ reform
US News and World Report, Sep. 30 96
5. Institutional not personalities are the key to a moderate and democ. Russia
Hailes and Martel 95
Underview
1. Yeltsin will lose 2000 election
The Economist, July 11, 98
2. Yelstin will die (bad card)
The Sacremento Bee, July 21 98
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Nunn-Lugar Affirmative - Davis/Happe
Teams Running This Case: 44, 47, 48, 49, 50
Obs.1 Inherency
-- Russia is failing at the security of its nuclear material
Lugar, 1997 ( Federal News Service , LN)
-- Additionally, Nunn - Lugar's funding is not being increased.
Lugar , 1997 ( Federal News Service , LN)
Plan: The United States federal government will give necessary money and
appropriate technology to Russia to transport inventory and physically secure
all fissile material not addressed by Nunn- Lugar except verification. Funding
and enforcement guaranteed. Aff reserves right to clarify plans intent.
Adv. 1 terrorism: leakage leads to a quick and direct nuclear threat against
the U.S. and nuclear blackmail - it subsumes all other risks. Graham Allison,
Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard and Director of the center for science and
international affairs at Harvard's JFK school of Govt. 1996
Nuclear Terrorist will use nuclear weapons without hesitation. David, pps at
Johns Hopkins .
Nuclear terrorism would unleash apocalyptic impacts upon the world . Laquer ,
Walter, chairman of the international research council at center for strategic
and international studies " postmodern terrorism" Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct p.39
1996
Adv. 2 Prolif: Russian leakage of fissile materials has created a huge demand-
it's inevitable that rogue nations will proliferate it. Allison, 1996
Right now there is a low incentive for prolif. and dangerous nations don't have
nuclear- leakage will lead to rapid and prolif for 4 reasons. Allison 1996
Prolif guarantees nuclear annihilation. David, Stephen , professor of political
science- Johns Hopkins university, International Security, Winter 1992-93
Obs 3 Solvency: Russia is now a unique environment for leakage due to internal
problems. Allison, 1996
Leakage will only worsen , becoming the number one threat to the U.S. Allison
1996
Increased funding will solve Russia's loose nuclear problem. The Dallas Morning
News March 10 1998.
Nuclear facilities are inadequate- even a small decrease in accuracy leads to
high risk of fissile loss. Allison, 1996.
Storage facilities are not secure. Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1,
1997.
Nunn-Lugar solves nuclear weapon security. George Duffy, former DOD officials
working on NUNN- Lugar, 1997 ( in Dismantling the Cold War, Potter and Shields)
Transportation of fissile material in Russia is a critical scenario for
leakage. Allison, 1996
U.S. and Russia will cooperate, Robert Bell, the News Hour with Jim Lehreer,
March 19,1998
Cooperation solves for transparency in military, Richard Lugar, Jan 12,1998
(Congressional Press Releases)
Technology for verification exists- but Russia doesn't have any. Aviation Week
and Space Technology, June 23,1997
Nunn-Lugar increases accountability / verification. Dick Lugar, 10-2-1997 FDCH
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Sub Dismantling Affirmative - Davis/Happe
Teams Running This Case: 44
Plan --Resolved: The United States should substantially change its foreign
policy toward Russia by implementing the program to assist Russia in
dismantling their current inactive nuclear submarines. The federal government
will assess Russia's economiuc situation with regard to submarines including
Russia's current budget as well as foreign assistance, amnd per the
recommendations of Joshua Handler. The U.S. will provide sufficient financial
and technical assistance to subsidize cooperative United States/Russian
dismantlement of Russian subs., Also, the United States will subsidize both
Russian and U.S. private companies wishing to participate in the dismantlement,
while including any offered international cooperation. The U.S. will
underwrite all costs associated with storage and removal of waste and fuel from
these subs using optimal means, excluding dumping. (Funding will be specified
per individual plans. Plan will be modified on a team by team basis.)
[Advantages as per Lundberg/Sahni Lab.]
Advantage 1: Sea Dumping
-- US must act or the nuclear waste agreement collapses
-- Absent agreement, dumping continues
-- Waste kills eskimo populations and species
-- Coastal areas key to all life
-- Impact is linear -- each bit of leakage devastating
Advantage 2: Nuclear Theft
-- Lack of security on subs open to theft
-- Theft = Russian civil war
Advantage 3: Big Boom
-- Decaying missiles in subs risk detonation
-- One explosion could = chain reaction
-- Kills thousands
-- Only international assistance can solve risk of meltdown
-- Kills the ozone layer as well
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Bioweapons Terrorism Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30
Plan: The United States should in essential respects change its foreign policy
toward Russia by establishing the "Pathogens Initiative," as per the
recommendations of the National Academy of Science. Upon establishment the
United States will encourage the center to engage in sustained joint US-Russian
research and related efforts to develop bioweapons vaccines, and to conduct
general medical research pertinent to pathogens.
Advantage 1 -- We Reduce Bioterrorism
State sponsored biological weapons research is being sold to terrorists
worldwide. The new bio-weapons likely to be developed threaten world
stability. Terrorists use them. We have a moral obligation to reduce
bioweapons spread. The joint center, proposed by the NAS, would slow the
spread.
General note: Our teams reserve the right to run any of the shared
affirmatives, but the most likely to be run are DEFENSE CONVERSION (teams 21,
23, 25, 31) and NATO CONSULTATION (teams 21, 22, 26, 30). At this point we
have not made any specific changes, nor majorly revised, either case.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
GT-MHR Development Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 23, 25, 29
Plan: The USFG will accelerate the completion of the United States-Russian
GT-MHR joint development project and will negotiate implementation agreements
to increase GT-MHR use in Russia. Affirmative speeches clarify intent.
Inherency
We have a deal to provide Russia with technical specifications and design plans
for Gas Turbine reactors, and have preliminarily agreed to help them build a
demonstration GT-MHR plant. But the project is slowed by our unwillingness to
cough up the money. If the United States doesn't come through with accelerated
support, Russia will shift to MOX reactor designs.
MOX bad
Mox reactor designs produce plutonium waste, which risks terrorist diversion
and theft risks. Alison impact cards.
Solvency
GT-MHRs are feasible and cost effective. Plus, because they integrate deep
burn, once-through technologies, they avoid the plutonium reprocessing risks of
MOX. Plus they're generally safe and wonderful.
General note: Our teams reserve the right to run any of the shared
affirmatives, but the most likely to be run are DEFENSE CONVERSION (teams 21,
23, 25, 31) and NATO CONSULTATION (teams 21, 22, 26, 30). At this point we
have not made any specific changes, nor majorly revised, either case.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
De-Alert Nuclear Missiles Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 22, 26, 28, 31
Two versions are being prepared. The teams listed may choose to run either
version. Apart from the plan texts, the advantage claims (listed below) apply
to both. The big one has more solvency but gets into the Bailey turns a bit
worse. The little one has less solvency (harder to verify and so on), but we
think evades the Bailey turns completely. Both plans start by having the US
take unilateral steps to de-alert particular missile systems, and then we
bilaterally work with Russia to negotiate mutually agreed upon de-alerting
measures, which would be codified in a treaty.
(1) Big De-Alerting.
This was the version provided to the entire institute. The plan implements all
the recommendations offered by Bruce Blair in his March 31 Congressional
testimony. Funding and enforcement provided. Intent provided.
(2) Small De-Alerting.
This plan would implement only the mildest of Blair's recommendations. It
would NOT implement any of his ideas for decimating counterforce. The plan
would take a small de-alerting action for each area of the triad. For example,
for ground-based ICBMs we would implement the "take battery packs off missile
guidance systems"; for subs we would move launch codes to the other side of the
boat and move boats an hour out of missile range; bombers are already
de-alerted.
Inherency (for both)
US and Russia remain on hair trigger alert. This is dangerous, and unnecessary
in the post-Cold War world.
A1 (for both) -- Accidents
Risk is high, impacts huge and immoral. Billions die.
A2 (for both) -- Unauthorized Launch
Gonna happen.
A3 (for both) -- Terrorism
We're on the brink now. Terrorist diversion risks are huge. High priority
must be given to prevent this nuclear risk.
Solvency
We read mainly Blair evidence to prove that we get the advantages without
hurting deterrence. We either read the BIG general solvency cards, or the
SMALL detail-by-detail solvency cards.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Iran Missile Sanctions Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 21, 25, 27, 28
Plan: Congress will extend the Glenn Amendment to the IMPSA and the President
shall use the waiver provisions of the amendment to grant flexible waivers from
sanctions to all Russian companies which would otherwise be vulnerable to IMPSA
sanctioning. Funding and enforcement through normal means. Intent.
Inherency
Congress overwhelmingly passed IMPSA (Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions
Act), but Clinton vetoed it. IMPSA sanctions countries that sell or sold
missiles to Iran. Congress will soon override this veto, which will lead to a
nationalist backlash in Russia, killing US and Russia relations on such issues
as space exploration.
Four possible advantages --
A1 -- US-Russian Relations
Russia is already punishing some of these companies, so for Congress to pass
IMPSA will severely imperil relations in other areas and will destroy START II;
all this will lead to a totalitarian takeover because Russians will be angered.
A2 -- Iran
Currently Iran is making overtures to the US, because they seek our foreign
investment. But sanctions are suffocating their economy. The plan increases
the flexibility of our foreign policy toward Iran, key because a carrot and
stick approach will help us ensure they do not exert regional hegemony.
A3 -- We Make Sanctions Better
IMPSA is really unreasonable and inflexible, and it destroys the credibility of
all our sanctions, which entail non-proliferation efforts. Without improving
the sanctions system, free trade, US leadership, counter-terrorism efforts and
export promotion will all be subverted.
A4 -- Space Cooperation
The companies we are sanctioning are the companies most involved in the
Russian/US space station collaboration. This project is crucial to our
relations. Big impacts to collapse include nationalism, non-ratification of
big treaties (Orlando Sentinel 94)
Solvency
Waivers would increase our credibility and prevent the SOP subversion entailed
by congressionally imposed sanctions. The Glenn Amendment is key to sanctions
flexibility, which gets the exports and leadership advantages, and prevents
immoral foreign policy actions. Flexibility is also key to successful
reproachment with Iran and the eventual lifting of the sanctions on Iran, all
of which in turn is necessary to restrain Iranian aggression.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Caspian Sea Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31
Plan: The United States Federal Government and relevant agencies will offer
and engage Russia in bilateral negotiations aimed at establishing the Eurasian
Oil and Gas Association, as advocated by Robert Cutler. Enforcement
guaranteed, intent reserved.
Inherency
Caspian area oil development is inevitable, but there is an absence of solid
investment frameworks.
A1 -- Ethnic conflict
Russia ignites ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to sabotage
proposed oil pipelines. These conflicts escalate, drawing in Western and other
nations, ultimately resulting in nuclear war.
A2 -- Russian Imperialism
Russia is attempting to re-integrate the Newly Independent States because of
the potential oil profits. If successful, a new Russian Empire will collapse
their democratic transition and put world stability at risk.
Solvency
Russia/US cooperation in the region does not have to be zero-sum. EAOGA
provides a friendly, mutually beneficial environment for oil development.
General note: Our teams reserve the right to run any of the shared
affirmatives, but the most likely to be run are DEFENSE CONVERSION (teams 21,
23, 25, 31) and NATO CONSULTATION (teams 21, 22, 26, 30). At this point we
have not made any specific changes, nor majorly revised, either case.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Start START Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 21, 28, 29
The basic story is the same, but there are two potential solvency approaches.
Both are briefed, and these teams reserve the right to defend either one (of
course we'll specify when we disclose for rounds). One version implements
Michael Mazarr's proposal to negotiate down to VIRTUAL NUCLEAR ARSENALS. The
other implements Stanfield Turner's proposals to negotiate a system of
STRATEGIC ESCROW. Both versions claim to suspend US demands for START II
ratification, and create bilateral talks designed to implement a START III
treaty that will produce deep cuts, in both cases down to 1000 warheads.
Virtual Arsenals Plan: Per Mazarr's recommendations, the United States will
begin bilateral talks with Russia aimed at negotiating a START III Treaty that
will reduce nuclear warheads on both sides to 1000. Suitable verification
procedures will be negotiated and implemented. The negotiated treaty will be
signed by the President and ratified by the United States Senate. Funding and
enforcement as necessary will be assured. Intent.
VA -- Inherency
Arms reductions are inevitable because of deteriorating missile systems,
especially on the Russian side. This produces dangerous asymettry. Our
current policy is not to do START III until we've ratified START II, but the
Duma won't ratify START II. So it's the worst of both worlds.
VA -- A1 -- Crisis Instability
Current situation is unstable and future unilateral reductions will exacerbate
the problem. 1000 warheads on each side prevents decapitating first strike
capabilities and solves instability while maintaining deterrence through
virtual arsenals.
VA -- A2 -- Accidents
An accidental launch can happen now. Virtual nuclear arsenals solve that
threat by putting missiles in storage.
VA -- Solvency
Virtual arsenals pave the way for dismantlement, but preserve deterrence, since
all will know that we can reconstitute our forces as needed. 1000 nukes totals
solve for instability risk. The Russians want to do a START III deal now.
Strategic Escrow Plan: Per Stanfield Turner's recommendations, the United
States will begin bilateral talks with Russia aimed at implementing reciprocal
unilateral measures (RUMs), to eventually achieve a START III Treaty that will
reduce nuclear warheads on both sides to 1000. Remaining missiles will be
placed in strategic escrow. Suitable verification procedures will be
negotiated and implemented. RUMs will continue on an equal and reciprocal
basis. The negotiated treaty will be signed by the President and ratified by
the United States Senate. Funding and enforcement as necessary will be
assured. Intent.
SE -- Inherency
Same as above.
SE -- A1 -- Proliferation
Strategic escrow creates a stronger international anti-proliferation norm, and
strengthens US credibility on existing treaties and programs.
SE -- A2 -- Loose Nukes
Current system encourages nuclear leakage. Escrow solves that.
SE -- Solvency
Escrow works, preserves deterrence, and can be negotiated successfully.
DARTMOUTH DEBATE INSTITUTE
July 19 - August 16, 1998
Add Russia to Mideast Peace Talks Affirmative - Cheshier/Mead
Teams Running This Case: 23, 31
Plan: In order to substantially change US foreign policy toward Russia, the
appropriate actors in the federal government will offer Russia permanent
diplomatic involvement in all future negotiations and talks concerning the
Golan Heights. Aff speeches = intent.
Inherency
The peace process is dead. The US has such a pro-Israeli bias that Syria
doesn't trust us as a neutral arbiter. Syria will launch an attack on the
Golan. We are currently locking Russia out of the process.
Harms
Terrorism -- Syria sponsors terrorism to solidify their position on the Golan,
in response to Israeli intransigence. Syria Attack -- Syria will use military
means to take back the Golan if talks break down.
Solvency
Bringing Russia into the talks brings Syria back to the table. Negotiations
avoid the resort to violence.
General note: Our teams reserve the right to run any of the shared
affirmatives, but the most likely to be run are DEFENSE CONVERSION (teams 21,
23, 25, 31) and NATO CONSULTATION (teams 21, 22, 26, 30). At this point we
have not made any specific changes, nor majorly revised, either case.
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